The Hindu - OPCW winning Nobel Peace

In awarding the Nobel Peace Prize to the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the Norwegian Nobel Committee has given another leg up to the goal of ridding the world of weapons of mass destruction. In 2005, the Peace Prize went to the International Atomic Energy Agency. Though it is tempting to see the 2013 Prize as an acknowledgement simply of the OPCW’s difficult and ongoing mandate to monitor the destruction of Syria’s chemical munitions, the organisation has done a commendable job since it came into being in 1997 as the custodian of the Chemical Weapons Convention. As many as 189 countries are party to the CWC’s ban on chemical munitions; under the treaty’s terms, they are obliged to declare and destroy any stockpiles they possess within a clear timeframe. Unlike the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which gives the United States, Russia, China, France, and Great Britain special status, the CWC is non-discriminatory. Unfortunately, as the Nobel Committee observes in its citation for the OPCW, “certain states have not observed the deadline, which was April 2012, for destroying their chemical weapons. This applies especially to the U.S. and Russia.” The U.S. has sought another decade to destroy its arsenal, while Russia is expected to complete the process only by 2018. The irony of thrashing out a deal to eliminate Syria’s CW stocks while lagging behind on their own commitments must not be lost on both countries. For its part, India has complied fully with the treaty, having eliminated its chemical stockpile four years ago.

Apart from living up to their disarmament commitments, the big powers must also ensure there is no interference with the OPCW’s functioning. The organisation relies both on technical and diplomatic expertise to fulfil its objectives. Yet, it has been impeded by partisan politics in the past: in the run-up to the illegal U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, the Bush administration managed to oust OPCW Director-General José Maurício Bustani when it emerged the Brazilian diplomat would stand in its way. Mr. Bustani had sought to engage Saddam Hussein, with a view to ensuring Iraq’s accession to the CWC. By bottling the OPCW and using entities like the U.N. Special Commission for Iraq to further its own interests, the U.S. has done no service to the goal of eliminating WMDs. The role of the OPCW in Syria — given the limited time it has for its mission — will now be thrown into sharp relief. The stakes are high and the organisation must be allowed to do its job without coercion or meddling from outside. The quick and effective elimination of Syria’s chemical weapons would reinforce the world’s faith in multilateralism and vindicate the Nobel Committee’s choice for what is arguably its most prestigious prize.

The Economist - why chemical weapons taboo?

ON AUGUST 21ST almost 1,500 people were killed in a nerve-agent attack in Syria. It was not just the scale of the atrocity which caused international outrage, but the fact that chemical weapons had been used. This crossed a "red line" previously defined by Barack Obama, prompting America to consider intervention against the Syrian regime, which is assumed by most observers to have been responsible for the attack. But then John Kerry, America's secretary of state, suggested on September 9th that military intervention could be avoided if the Syrian regime placed its entire chemical stockpile under international control. Syria's ally Russia backed this suggestion, and on September 11th Bashar al-Assad, Syria's president, announced that he was prepared to go along with it.On September 14th a joint Russian-American framework was agreed to eliminate the weapons. But why is the use of chemical weapons especially taboo?

The first ban on chemical weapons was actually introduced before they had even been used. At the Hague convention in 1899, projectiles “the sole object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gasses” were prohibited from international use. Even so, chemical weapons were deployed in Europe during the first world war by both sides. But they were not turned against civilians, unlike aerial bombardment and submarine torpedoes. When the Geneva protocol was agreed in 1925 the ban on chemical weapons was reiterated. During the second world war the taboo against them became stronger. Political leaders discussed their use at length. America decided not to use gas in its attack on the island of Iwo Jima. Adolf Hitler used Zyklon B poison gas in concentration camps, but refrained from using chemical weapons on the battlefield. Being the weapon that not even Hitler would use increased the stigma.

The taboo against the use of chemical weapons arises, in large part, from the shocking scale on which they can kill and the insidious and indiscriminate way they spread. But it also stems from the infrequency of their use. Because the ban on their deployment has mostly been observed, political leaders are, by and large, even less willing to flout it, thus reinforcing the taboo. The most notorious exception after the second world war was when Saddam Hussein used chemical weapons against Iran in the Iran-Iraq war, and against Kurds and other minorities in Iraq. Then in 1995 Aum Shinrikyo, a cult group, attacked the Tokyo metro system with a home-made nerve-gas, killing dozens of commuters. That attack heightened fears that terrorist groups might employ chemical weapons, further strengthening the taboo. That said, in many respects chemical weapons are no worse than other means of killing people. Mr Assad has shelled, bombed and beheaded his citizens too. Yet it was his use of chemical weapons that was considered intolerable and has prompted international action.

The Syrian armed forces have one of the largest stockpiles of chemical weapons: around 1,000 tonnes, including the nerve agents Sarin and VX. Getting rid of the weapons, assuming the Russian-American deal can be made to stick, will take considerable time. As Syria's civil war continues, it will be difficult for United Nations inspectors to reach all the sites where the weapons are stored, many of which are in areas where heavy fighting is under way. And despite the deal, Mr Assad may not keep his word. The exceptional taboo that surrounds the use of chemical weapons has contributed to a diplomatic breakthrough, but dismantling Syria's deadly chemical arsenal will be hard, if not impossible, without a wider ceasefire.

The Hindu - probable war on syria

There is neither any justification for the West's imminent military intervention nor any substance to its claim that the assault will be limited and short-lived.

An air strike on Damascus and other strongholds of the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria, led by the U.S, U.K. and France, seems imminent. In the days and weeks to come, we will be duly informed by pundits that Syria is not Iraq - and hence not a shambolic intervention - what with its proven arsenal of weapon of mass destruction (WMDs). This military assault, we will be told, will be quick and decisive, and intended only to deter Mr. Assad and other war criminals from using chemical weapons. Above all, the familiar refrain of the United Nations’ “inability to act” on Syria will be sold as the primary motivation behind this illegal intervention.

For starters, the claim that a Western air strike will be short-lived – according to a Washington Post report, lasting for all of two days – is absurd. It is incredulous to suggest a “drive-by” attack will somehow make the Syrian government think twice before using chemical weapons, if it has not already done so. On the contrary, Bashar al-Assad made it clear last year he will resort to them if Syria is attacked from outside. History too bears adversely on such claims. In 1998, the US and UK bombed Iraq without UN Security Council sanction, with the goal of taking out its WMD manufacturing facilities. Operation Desert Fox, which lasted for four days, not only went well beyond its mandate of targeting WMD-specific installations in Iraq, but also set back UN efforts at disarming the regime. In its aftermath, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger famously said, “I would be amazed if a three-day campaign made a decisive difference, or if we can even precisely define what we meant by WMDs that we were going after [...].” The fog of war that persisted after this bombing allowed the Western military-industrial complex in 2003 to invade Iraq, on the pretext of destroying WMDs.

The NATO attack on Yugoslavia in 1999 - which in the backdrop of a deadlocked Security Council, is being held up as a precedent to justify an assault on Syria - too began with the objective of halting President Slobodan Milosevic’s aggression. In the carpet bombing that followed, NATO’s deplorable targeting of civilian facilities, including hospitals and embassies, to attain its objective has been well documented. As with the NATO’s 2011 intervention in Libya, we can be sure Syria’s broadcasting agencies and media outlets, especially the Syrian Arab News Agency, will be targeted in this attack.

No intervention against the regime can be successful without taking out its powerful propaganda machine. Make no mistake: whatever the Obama administration may have us believe, the military intervention in Syria is not going to be quick, decisive or limited in scope.

Unilateral intervention predicated on the use of WMDs by a regime finds no backing in international law. Whether the West likes it or not, there is no alternative to legitimising the use of force in Syria but through express sanction from the UN Security Council. The Obama administration’s attempts to circumvent the UN Charter in this regard represent one of the greatest threats to the comity of nations since the Second World War. As Ian Hurd, a political scientist at North-western University, notes, the United States has always been careful to justify its aggression under the Article 2(4) of the Charter, which generally prohibits unauthorised intervention. Even the egregious unilateralism of the Bush years saw the United States trying to mount a defence, however indefensible, of the Iraqi invasion under the UN Charter. President Barack Obama instead plans to justify his attack on Syria based on principles contained in the Geneva Conventions and the Chemical Weapons Convention, neither of which is applicable in this context. Syria is not even a signatory to the CWC. In effect, the United States is asking a sovereign state to comply with the provisions of a treaty it has not signed, failing which it will intervene militarily. How’s that for sound legal precedent?

The West has sought to advertise this intervention as its stepping in where the UN failed. If airstrikes do occur as planned, it is unlikely the international community will get to know if Ds were ever used in Syria, either by the Assad regime or by the rebels. The UN, which has dispatched an inspection team to verify such claims, will not have had an opportunity to present its findings at the Security Council. The Wall Street Journal has reported how the Obama administration in fact tried to convince the UN to pull its team out from Damascus. This is now a recurrent pattern: the UN Monitoring team in Iraq, which in 2003 found little evidence to substantiate the Bush administration’s WMD claims, was discredited by the West for standing up to its warmongering. NATO’s bombing of Libya offered no chance for the Security Council to hear on-the-ground reports from the UN Secretary General’s Special Representative. The French intervention in Mali earlier this year came after Paris failed to address the African International Support Mission’s (AFISMA) long-standing request – endorsed by the UNSC – for financial and logistical assistance. The quick and dirty multilateralism that the West wants and achieves through “coalitions of the willing” is no substitute for the UN’s deliberative process. Hans Blix, head of the 2003 UN inspection team in Iraq, rightly suggested in an interview to Huffington Post recently, “political dynamics are running ahead of due process.”

Those who assert the United States and its allies have been reluctant to intervene in this conflict perhaps suffer from selective memory loss. As early as October 2011, and in July 2012, the West put forth draft resolutions in the Security Council that invoked Chapter VII measures under the UN Charter – their passing would have effectively allowed for military intervention in Syria. The dogs of war have thus far only been allowed to bark. It is imperative the international community steps in immediately, before they are unchained.

The Hindu - bitter are the fruits of Arab spring

Over the weekend of August 16-18, 30,0000 Syrians crossed into Iraq over the Peshkhabour Bridge that spans River Tigris. They left the towns of Aleppo, Efrin, Hassake and Qamishly for the Kurdish region, where UNHCR field officers were stunned to see them. “The factors allowing this sudden movement are not fully clear to us,” said spokesperson Adrian Edwards. Thousands continue to make the transit, leaving a Syria paralysed by what U.N. envoy Lakhdar Brahimi calls “a civil war, a sectarian war, and a proxy war,” and entering Iraq, where a string of car bombs over the past month has brought the highest death toll since 2008. A major bomb blast in Beirut’s southern district of Dahieh (which means suburb) rattled Lebanon, where one million Syrians have sought refuge — now one in four of the people who live in this small Levantine country. Sounds of gunfire and bombs have become routine from the Mediterranean coast to the Iranian border, from the souqs of Egypt to the small coastal towns of Libya.

Since the Arab Spring of 2011 opened up in North Africa, all eyes are focused there once more as events seem to turn the clock backwards. In Tunisia, assassinations of left-wing leaders (Chokri Belaid and Mohammed Brahmi) convulsed the country into recriminations. Next-door Libya has been beset with major security challenges, and the new government of Ali Zeidan finds his Interior Ministers and his defence chiefs playing an uneasy game of musical chairs. The most dramatic events are reserved for Egypt, the self-defined centre of the Arab world. The massacres of August 14 portend for many a turn in Egypt toward the kind of slide into darkness that took place in Syria through the second half of 2011. Crackdowns against peaceful protests, there as well, morphed into a major collapse of state hegemony and the development of a serious and unending civil war.

Keeping the lines open

A year ago, the U.N. turned to its veteran Lakhdar Brahimi to start a political process in Syria. Its previous envoy, former U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan, had failed, as had every detachment from the Arab League. Already catastrophic numbers of dead and of injured filled the rosters of the U.N. agencies tasked with relief. When Mr. Brahimi began he was sceptical, but nonetheless met with the various opposition groups as well as Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. After a meeting with the latter in December 2012, Mr. Brahimi found himself the brunt of a hostile speech by Mr. Assad the next month. The Syrian state media, Mr. Brahimi said in an interview this month, was “not only critical of my declarations — which would be perfectly acceptable — but insulting, at times in the most vulgar terms.” Mr. Brahimi’s deputy, Mokhtar Lamani, maintains an office in Damascus and keeps an open line to the regime. The myriad and fractious opposition groups are also in touch with Mr. Brahimi, whose calls for an end to the supply of arms to both sides has led to some conflict with the rebel groups. There is no question that the war inside Syria remains asymmetrical, despite some defections from the armed forces to the rebellion, and that the destruction of the cities and the killing of civilians have proceeded apace. “The biggest concern,” Mr. Brahimi says mournfully, “is that one day Syrians and everyone else will wake up to find that Syria has been completely destroyed.”

Unwilling to relent

Does an exit remain for the carnage that has claimed over 100,000 lives? Neither side in the conflict is genuine about a ceasefire and a peace process. Mr. Brahimi called for a four-day ceasefire over the Id al-Adha holiday, which was accepted by all parties. But it did not hold. The Assad regime believes that it has the upper hand on the ground, with the rebels defeated in several strongholds along their logistical supply chain (notably when the regime took back Al Qusayr and Homs). The local geo-politics has also altered to Mr. Assad’s favour. The Gezi Park protests in Turkey as well as the revival of the Kurdish resistance have dampened the Erdogan government’s neo-Ottoman policy. The new emir of Qatar has had to drawdown the ambitions of the small emirate as their ally has fallen in Egypt and as their old rivalry with Saudi Arabia has given the advantage to the latter. The Syrian opposition, on the other hand, is undaunted as Saudi Arabia presses its advantage amongst them with its funds and as the North Atlantic states continue to give verbal support to their ambitions.

Sucked into the vortex

The powers that live far from the region (the U.S. and Russia) play their Cold War type antics in Syria, whose neighbours will have to suffer the consequences of its social haemorrhage. Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq are being sucked into the vortex of the civil war, says Mr. Brahimi. But they are not the only ones who will suffer. “Remember 11 September 2001,” asks Mr. Brahimi chillingly. “That was the direct result of the neglect of the conflict in Afghanistan.” The U.S. and Russia have committed themselves to a process that is called Geneva II, whose meeting has been repeatedly postponed because, as Mr. Brahimi notes, “the conditions for starting that conference with a reasonable chance of success are not there yet.” The reason Mr. Brahimi did not create a peace plan over the course of the year is that he believes Mr. Annan’s plan is sufficient. It is not the lack of a peace plan that stops the process; it is the lack of trust between the parties to agree to any plan. A U.S.-Russia meeting in The Hague next week is unlikely to result in any forward motion.

If the far powers (U.S./Russia) cannot or will not broker such a peace, two other blocs exist for the task. One of them, the Syria Contact Group (Egypt, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Turkey), worked in 2012 with no support from the international community. In fact, the U.S. and the Russians consistently undermined it. With the turmoil in Egypt and Turkey, and with an ascendant Saudi Arabia, it is unlikely that the Contact Group will be revived. Prince Bandar bin Sultan, head of the Saudi Intelligence Directorate, travelled to Moscow to insert the Kingdom into the process but returned with nothing concrete. It is a sign that Riyadh wants to have a seat at the table with Moscow and Washington, rather than be part of a regional platform.

If the regional players have failed, convulsed by the implosion of the Arab Spring, and the far powers are uninterested in a foundation for peace, it is perhaps appropriate for the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) to send envoys to both the Assad regime and the opposition. India could play a crucial role in such an endeavour.

India's advantage

The Syrian government and the opposition see India as a sober party. India’s votes at the U.N. have depended on the merits of each vote rather than based on partisan support in one direction or another. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s statement at the 2012 NAM meeting in Tehran set out a course that appeals to all sides: “India supports popular aspirations for a democratic and pluralistic order. Nevertheless, such transformations cannot be prompted by external intervention, which exacerbate the suffering of ordinary citizens.” Verbal support is no longer enough. India needs to push for a NAM, a BRICS delegation or a Sino-Indian delegation to visit all sides and press for a ceasefire and a new peace process. It is the kind of initiative that Mr. Brahimi needs, anything to revive the dialogue and prevent Syria from slipping into a social coma.

Guardian - Israel 's air strikes in Syria

US officials say Israel targeted advanced anti-ship cruise missiles nearSyria's principal port city, Latakia, in an air attack this month, the New York Times reported.

The officials say the attack on 5 July near Latakia targeted a type of Russian-made missile called the Yakhont that Russia had sold to the Syrian government, the paper's website reported. Russia is a key political ally and arms supplier of Syrian president Bashar al-Assad's regime.

The officials provided no details on the strike, including the extent of the damage and how many missiles were used. The Times reported that the officials declined to be identified because they were discussing intelligence reports.

Israel maintains it is not involved in Syria's two-year-old civil war except to stop weapons transfers. The strike near Latakia was the fourth known air strike in Syria by Israel this year, the newspaper reported.

The attack came to light after Syrian rebels said they were not behind the explosions in Latakia on 5 July, according to the Times. Neither US nor Israeli officials have commented publicly on the report.

Reports surfaced earlier this year that Russia had delivered an advanced version of its Yakhont anti-ship cruise missile to Assad's regime even though Russia had said it was committed to peace talks. Those reports prompted the US to complain in May about an "ill-timed" step by Russia.

Such weapons would help to upgrade significantly Syria's capacity to target manned planes, drones and incoming missiles and would complicate efforts to enforce a no-fly zone over Syria if the US and other nations were to initiate one.

NYT - Syrian economic crisis

Bashar-al-Assad introduced moderate economic reforms and liberalisation early in his tenure.

Currently many factors like the opposition, destruction of factories and agricultural lands, disruption of the economic life, international sanctions, and according to Govt, "corrupt traders" all caused severe fall in the value of Syrian pound, from prewar 47 to current 330 per dollar.

The Govt blames liberalisation and closing up its economy again, and insists on agreements on foreign trade with only friendly countries (Russia, Iran, china). Syria was well known for its self sufficiency, low national debt and its social security net earlier. However, it is now taking loans from Iran (1 billion dollar credit line) and importing oil from Russia and trying to cut cost leakages in its highly subsidised staple food and fuels. Its foreign reserves have fallen to 2-5 billion from the previous 18 billion dollars.

The Hindu - Syrian crisis

http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/a-syrian-fire-that-could-consume-all/article4797899.ece

The simplistic assessment of the crisis being only about a repressive regime needs to change

Under way for over two years, the Syrian civil war has already claimed close to 80,000 lives. In and of itself, this should have been sufficient to stir the conscience of the international community to redouble efforts to persuade the Assad regime and an assortment of rebels armed to the teeth, to walk back from the violence and commence a Syrian-led negotiating process for an acceptable outcome. Unfortunately, maximalist positions of the two sides — President Assad’s exit demanded by the West, Turkey and the Gulf states, and treating the crisis as a security issue by the Assad regime — has prevented any serious attempt at reconciliation.

Geneva 2

Despite agreement between the United States and Russia to convene Geneva 2, some time in the second half of June, the facts on the ground clearly suggest that the initiative is unlikely to succeed. In fact, the actions of the international community’s major stakeholders are continuing to exacerbate the crisis. The simplistic fig leaf that this was a brutal and repressive regime targeting innocent and helpless civilians, demanding their democratic rights as part of the Arab Spring, needs to be shed in favour of more clinical assessments.

Drawing inspiration from the three easy steps for regime change in Libya — a Security Council Resolution, arming of rebels and NATO military action, the rebels, who were armed quite openly by Qatar and covertly by Saudi Arabia and clandestinely by others — the West and Gulf states expected the same in Syria. Given the Libyan experience and strategic interests of Russia, however, the Security Council failed to oblige. Russia and China vetoed three draft resolutions in 2011-12. Unilateral military action by NATO or Coalition of the Willing did not materialise either.

More important still, there are increasing doubts on whether arming the rebels was such a good idea given the proliferation of extremists groups, one of which, the Al-Nusra Front, had to be banned by the U.S. How does one ensure that arms go only to the good rebels? Even the description of “good” is subjective. Turkey and Qatar, it would appear, have no hesitation in supporting rebels drawing inspiration from the Islamic Brotherhood; Saudi Arabia favours Salafist groups. Hopefully, they all agree that al-Qaeda does not qualify for assistance.

With sectarian fault lines within Syria now opened threadbare, the possibility of the present compact that has ruled Syria comprising 12 per cent Alawites, 10 per cent Christians and some Sunni business class continuing to exercise power in any post-Assad dispensation, is a non-starter. Given the brutality of the violence on both sides, the prevailing sentiment among the Sunnis backed by Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia and sections of the political class in the West not fully educated in the sectarian tensions of the region, is to “send the Alawites to their graves and the Christians to Lebanon.” Clearly, no post-Assad dispensation in Syria will be viable unless effective security guarantees can be provided for the safety of nearly 20 per cent of the population. Who will provide these?

The “top down” model for a negotiated settlement on which Geneva 1 was based last year and on which Geneva 2, if it has to have better luck than Geneva 1, has to be predicated on all parties to the conflict agreeing to participate. That is the easiest part. Agreement can also perhaps be reached that both Saudi Arabia and Iran, given their stake in the civil war, should be invited. Now comes the more difficult part.

Militias

The just concluded battle for Qusayr shows that this is now a full-fledged war in which the Lebanon-based Shiite group, Hezbollah, is openly and fully involved. Any residual doubts were removed when the Hezbollah leader, Nasrullah, explicitly so announced on May 25.

With 12,000 Hezbollah fighters now reportedly fighting along with Assad’s troops and paramilitary militias drawn from his Alawite sect against an assortment of rebels, mostly Sunnis with varying degrees of radicalisation, a negotiated settlement would appear less likely than at any time in the last two years.

For Hezbollah, established to fight Israel, this is clearly a gamble. Apart from fighting the Syrian rebels, they will have to confront pan-Arab sentiment. In the process, tensions between the Shia crescent from Iran, covering Iraq, Syria and the Hezbollah in Lebanon and the Gulf states and their western backers can only increase. A desire to weaken the Iran-dominated crescent cannot but open the sectarian fault lines throughout the region.

Hezbollah’s more direct involvement, rather the timing of the announcement coincides with Russia’s decision to supply the Assad regime with more sophisticated weaponries. The Russian decision constitutes, in a sense, an insurance just in case the U.S. is persuaded by the British and the French to consider the imposition of a no-fly zone and aerial action. Israeli strikes in Syria, in turn, want to prevent the sophisticated weapons falling in to the hands of Hezbollah for use against Israel.

The European Union announced on May 27 that it has decided not to renew the embargo on supply of lethal arms to the Syrian rebels.

Internal divisions

The humanitarian tragedy unfolding for Syria’s 22 million people, with close to four million internally displaced and the increasing brutality of the sectarian violence would appear to point towards a prolongation of the civil war. Even the fall of President Assad’s regime is now unlikely to restore peace and security in Syria. Sectarian war will not only continue, but result in the country’s de facto division into three largely autonomous regions dominated by the Alawites, Kurds and Sunnis, the internal boundaries of which will be determined by the prevailing military balance on the ground.

The assessment that while Libya imploded, Syria will explode with unimaginable consequences will prove to be right. The unfolding scenario constitutes the biggest threat to international peace and security in recent times. The continuing paralysis and helplessness of the Security Council constitutes, in a sense, also the most comprehensive statement of its irrelevance.